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Abstract. We take a general model of externalities matching the Cooper &
John framework with identical agents. If each agent￿ s payo⁄ depends on a parameter
interpreted as the favourableness of the environment, we explore how the number
of Nash equilibria varies with this parameter, especially in the cases in which the
reaction curves are either concave or convex. In many examples the environmental
conditions are themselves endogenous because either market or regulatory forces
interact with agents￿Nash equilibrium actions. This gives the idea of a simultaneous
equilibrium in the environment and players￿symmetric actions. We analyse how
this generalised equilibrium behaves as a function of some additional parameters
conditioning the environmental response to players actions. We show that generally
there is a fold bifurcation in these equilibria.
We illustrate the principles with two examples from industrial economics (cost
spillovers between ￿rms and demand spillovers under imperfect competition).
Keywords: cost spillovers, Nash and Market equilibrium, coordination failure
JEL Nos: C62, C72, D43, D62
1. Introduction
There is a huge literature on models in which the setting naturally involves strategic
complementarity and non-cooperative behaviour. This originates with the synthesising
paradigm of Cooper & John (1988) and has applications in both macroeconomic (King
and Wolman, 2004) and microeconomic (Echenique and Sabarwal, 2003) areas. There are
various key results in this area: typically there will be multiple non-cooperative equilibria,
in most applications some of these are more socially desirable than others. It follows that
the system envisaged can get stuck at an undesirable noncooperative equilibrium. In
Cooper and John and the subsequent applications often the environment is de￿ned by
some exogenous parameter ￿-for any given value of ￿ there are likely to be these multiple
conditional equilibria (conditional on a ￿xed value of ￿). Usually ￿ is interpreted as
re￿ ecting the favourableness of the environment to each player. So higher values of ￿
induce all the players to choose higher levels of actions, given what the other players
choose, and then, with strategic complementarity, multiplier e⁄ects will arise, with the
aggregate response exceeding each individual response (Cooper & John,(1988)).
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However there are unanswered questions. How does the con￿guration of conditional
noncooperative equilibria vary with ￿, for example do the number of non-cooperative
equilibria systematically vary with ￿ and how can we characterise the di⁄erent equilib-
ria that arise beyond saying that they di⁄er in their social desirability? Also is ￿ really
exogenous or are there forces which will interact with the noncooperative behaviour of
players to induce changes in ￿? If so then we would have an unconditional joint (￿;action)
equilibrium. In many applications this is the case, eg in market situations ￿ may be
the price and players actions are demands or supplies in which case the requirements of
market equilibrium naturally induce an interdependence between players actions and ￿:
Alternatively ￿ may be a regulatory parameter set in response to players actions. The
questions are important: ￿rst if there are multiple equilibria we cannot predict the be-
haviour of the system in terms of either its long run position or its response to parameter
changes. Secondly the appropriate policy control measures can vary with the equilibrium
that we are trying to attain. But if there is another layer of adjustment through ￿ then
endogenous variation in ￿ could eliminate the indeterminacy eg if the only unconditional
equilibrium values of ￿ generate a unique non-cooperative conditional equilibrium in ac-
tions. If this happens then multiplicity of equilibria with strategic complementarity is not
fundamental-embedding the conditional equilibria in a more general equilibrium model
eliminates the indeterminacy.
Cooper & John focus on symmetric Nash equilibria in actions for a given ￿; ie with
mutual best responses all players choose the same action x given ￿. Vives (2005) also uses
this approach. Given our assumptions (which mirror but add to Cooper & John) all Nash
equilibria will also be symmetric and will be characterised by a common action x.
We impose some additional structure on players best response functions (in particular
taking them to be concave or convex in the average action of rivals) which allows us to
characterise the number and nature of noncooperative equilibria for a given ￿: However
variations in ￿ can lead to qualitative shifts in the equilibrium con￿gurations, we there-
fore examine these shifts. Three aspects of the externality matter: whether it reduces orConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities3
increases a player￿ s action (a bene￿cial or detrimental externality); whether it increases
or reduces the marginal return to a player￿ s action (complementary or substitutable ex-
ternalities) and ￿nally whether the curvature of the reaction function is positive (convex
reaction curve) or negative (concave reaction curve). These correspond to the signs of
di⁄erent order derivatives of the players￿payo⁄ functions. The qualitative shifts occur
because the Nash equilibrium correspondence (giving the equilibrium non-cooperative ac-
tion x as a function of ￿) is multivalued for intermediate ￿, due to the multiplicity of
Nash equilibria. For example, with three Nash equilibria existing for a certain range of
intermediate ￿, agents can end up at any of the three.
Next we introduce a broader idea of equilibrium in which ￿ and the actions of the
players are simultaneously and endogenously determined. We call this an unconditional
￿ ￿ x equilibrium. In this broader equilibrium not only are players in Nash equilibrium
given ￿ but also the Nash equilibrium action x and ￿ are linked through an additional
general function ￿ = ￿(x). For example ￿ could re￿ ect external market or regulatory
conditions and the value of ￿ adjusts with the action x of the agents. We analyse the
nature of ￿ ￿ x equilibria for di⁄erent types of positive spillovers and di⁄erent forms of
￿(x). In fact, for the sake of transparency, we take ￿(x) = A ￿ Bx (but the principles
are general). We focus on how the equilibrium manifold f￿;xg = H(A;B) varies with
the intercept and slope of ￿(x). As ￿(x) varies we encounter critical equilibria- marginal
changes in the function ￿(x) can lead to qualitative changes in the equilibrium con￿gu-
rations, e.g. changing the ￿nite number of ￿ ￿ x equilibria between one, two and three
depending on the nature of the spillovers. This is important, it means that we can explain
sudden occasional structural shifts in individual actions as a response to just marginal
environmental changes. On the other hand it also means that the additional equilibrating
mechanism through ￿ will not generally help in improving determinacy of the system. So
the multiplicity of equilibrium which arises with strategic complementarity is fundamental
in the sytems we study.
We use the Cooper & John framework to illustrate the principles: I identical agentsConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities4
with an action externality between them, increasing and concave (in own action) payo⁄
functions, multiplier e⁄ects arising from a common factor ￿ and add to it a downward
sloping ￿(x) function. In the ￿nal section we analyse some examples: ￿rst a case of
price taking ￿rms with a cost externality (here ￿ is identi￿ed with the real output price).
Second a case of imperfectly competitive ￿rms with product di⁄erentiation where the
spillover comes through the demand for a ￿rm￿ s output. An interesting feature of this
example is that the reaction function will not necessarily be monotonic so that in this
case asymmetric Nash equilibria may also arise.
2. Conditional Nash Equilibria in games with strategic
complementarities.
Cooper and John,(1988), have a ￿xed number I of agents, with payo⁄ functions given by
V (xi;ki;￿) i = 1;::;I
where xi ￿ 0 denotes the action of each individual player, i = 1;::;I. ki is an aggregate
index denoting the average action of all the other players
ki = ￿j6=ixj=(I ￿ 1) i = 1;::;I
and ￿ is a parameter common to all players￿payo⁄ functions. The functions V (￿) exhibit
the following properties:
A1 (i) Vx (x;k;￿) > 0, (ii) Vxx (x;k;￿) < 0, (iii) Vxk (x;k;￿) > 0, (iv) Vx￿ (x;k;￿) > 0
Assumptions (i) and (ii) simply mean that the functions V (￿) are increasing and
concave in the agent￿ s own choice; assumption (iii) implies that the marginal payo⁄ of
any individual i increases with ki. In this context, the behavior of each agent will depend
on how he/she expects every other agent will act on average. Assumption (iv) implies
that larger values of ￿ tend to increase each individual agent￿ s action given the actions of
others.Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities5
Since payo⁄ functions are identical, the reaction functions are identical as well for all
agents and are de￿ned by1:
x￿ (ki;￿) = argmax
xi
fV (xi;ki;￿)jxi ￿ 0g i = 1;::;I
Given the assumptions on the V (￿) functions, the game exhibits strategic complementari-
ties. The reaction curves (RCs henceforth) of the players are positively sloped, with slope














Given these assumptions on the payo⁄ functions the Nash equilibria must be sym-
metric (see Appendix A1). Cooper and John,(1988), prove that the presence of strategic
complementarity is necessary for multiple symmetric equilibria to arise (see Figure 1). If
the RCs always had nonpositive slope there could be at most one Nash equilibrium.
1The best response xi of i is
xi solving Vx (xi;ki;￿) = 0 if Vx (0;ki;￿) ￿ 0










Figure 1: Multiple NE with strategic
complementarities
Figure 1 shows some alternative possible reaction functions with strategic comple-
mentarity and di⁄erent equilibrium patterns. It follows that to characterise the Nash
equilibria here we need to impose more structure on the payo⁄ functions.
Also Figure 1 is drawn for a given value of parameter ￿. Since Vx￿ > 0, changes in ￿
will cause the reaction functions to shift in a direction of increasing xi as ￿ rises with ki
constant. Thus as ￿ changes, the number of equilibria may change. In the extreme there
will be no Nash equilibria if ￿ is such that the reaction function is always on one side of
the 450 line.
We add some fairly weak assumptions
A2 V (0;ki;￿) = 0;V (xi;ki;￿) > 0 for xi > 0;ki ￿ 0
@V (0;0;￿)
@xi
is ￿nite for any ￿nite ￿
i.e., without the presence of the other agents, agent i has a ￿nite positive marginal
payo⁄ when his/her action is zero.Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities7
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This is of ambiguous sign. We call the reaction function concave if @2x￿=@k2
i < 0 every-
where and similarly convex if @2x￿=@k2
i > 0 everywhere.
What are the possible NE at ￿xed values of the parameter ￿?




￿ solves Vx (0;0;￿
￿) = 0
and the reaction curve for ￿ = ￿
￿ goes through the origin. At ￿
￿ if the other agents are
choosing xj = 0 for j 6= i then agent i wishes to choose xi = 0. We assume that ￿
￿ exists
and is ￿nite. For ￿ < ￿
￿ (the environment is less favourable), agent i will still stay inactive





so that i would be inactive at any k ￿ k). However, for more favourable environments
(￿ > ￿
￿), the intercept of the reaction curve is positive and individual i takes a positive
action even if all others have zero action.
2.1. Characterising NE With Concave Reaction Functions. Here the reaction
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Figure 2: Concave reaction functions
To see the nature of NE in this case we make an additional assumption on the payo⁄
functions:
A3 for any ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ there is a point (x;k) with k > x such that x = x￿(k;￿).
This condition implies that there must exist a point on the reaction curve below the
450 line for any ￿ ￿ ￿
￿. We can then characterise the NE with concave reaction functions.
1. First suppose that @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@ki > 1; this means that near the origin the reaction
function must be on the upper side of the 450 line at ￿ = ￿
￿.
(i) When ￿ = ￿
￿ there are two NE at ￿
￿, one with xi = ki = 0 and the other with









￿)=@ki > 1, we can de￿ne ￿
+ and x
+
i as the solution to
@x￿
@ki












= 0 i = 1;::;I
This de￿nes a point on the 450 line at which there is a reaction curve corresponding
to a parameter ￿
+ just tangent to the 450 line. Parameter ￿
+ must always exist (see
Appendix A2).
Then when ￿ = ￿
+ there is a Nash equilibrium on the 450 line with the reaction
function of ￿rm i just tangential to the 450 line. There is also another Nash equi-
librium at xi = ki = 0. This is because i0s best response is zero for any ki below
the horizontal intercept &i, as illustrated in Figure 3.
(iii) When ￿
+ < ￿ < ￿
￿ we have three NE, one at 0 and the other two with positive
agents￿choices, as shown in Figure 3 for ￿ = ￿2.
(iv) If ￿ < ￿
+ there is a unique Nash equilibrium at 0, as in Figure 3 when ￿ = ￿3.
(v) if ￿ > ￿
￿ there is a unique Nash equilibrium with positive choices, (as in Figure 3
for ￿ = ￿1), since we have assumed that the RC must cross the 450 line.Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities10
2. If @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@ki ￿ 1, then the reaction curve is always below the 450 line. In this
scenario, there is a unique Nash equilibrium at ￿







Figure 4: ￿ = ￿
￿, @x￿ (0;￿
￿)=@ki ￿ 1
As ￿ increases above ￿
￿ the reaction curve shifts vertically upwards, since, by assump-
tion, as parameter ￿ increases, the RCs can never cross. Hence the intermediate parameter
￿
+ does not exist if @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@ki < 1, but if @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@ki = 1 then ￿
+ = ￿
￿.
When ￿ > ￿
￿ there is a unique Nash equilibrium with positive choices similar to
Figure 3 for the case of ￿ = ￿1. On the other hand, when ￿ < ￿
￿ there is a unique Nash
equilibrium at the origin similar to Figure 3 for the case of ￿ = ￿3.











￿ 1;xi > 0 ￿ > ￿
￿ 1;xi > 0
￿ = ￿
￿ 2;xi > 0;xi = 0 ￿ = ￿
￿ 1;xi = 0
￿




i = 0 ￿ < ￿






+ > ￿ 1;xi = 0
Table 1: Number of NE with Concave RCs, ￿
￿ > ￿
+Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities11
2.2. Characterising NE with Convex Reaction Functions. If (1) is positive at
all x;k, then the reaction curve for ￿rm i is convex to the 450 line and shifts with ￿ as








Figure 5: Convex reaction functions
Again there are two cases depending on whether the slope of the reaction curve at the
origin (at ￿
￿) is greater or less than unity. In either case we assume that eventually for
high k there is a point on the reaction curve above the 450 line.





Figure 6: NE at ￿xed values of ￿,
@x￿ (0;￿
￿)=@ki < 1Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities12
1. If the slope of the reaction curve at the origin is less than unity (@x￿ (0;￿
￿)=@k < 1)
the reaction curve initially lies below the 450 line. Then at ￿
￿ there are two Nash
equilibria, one with zero choices and the other with positive choices on the 450
line. In this case parameter ￿
+ always exists (from an argument similar to that in
Appendix A2) and ￿
￿ < ￿
+. At ￿xed values of parameter ￿, the patterns of possible
NE (as shown in Figure 6) are:
(i) if ￿ > ￿
+ there is no Nash equilibrium
(ii) if ￿ = ￿
+ there is a unique Nash equilibrium with positive choices
(iii) if ￿
￿ < ￿ < ￿
+ there are two NE with positive choices
(iv) if ￿ < ￿
￿ there are two NE, one with positive choices and the other at 0
2. If the slope of the reaction curve at the origin is greater than or equal to unity at
￿
￿ (@x￿ (0;￿
￿)=@k ￿ 1) then at ￿
￿ the reaction curve is everywhere above the 450
line and at ￿
￿ the unique Nash equilibrium has choices 0. At ￿ > ￿
￿ there is no
Nash equilibrium, all agents would have an incentive to continually expand their
own choice. At ￿ < ￿
￿ the whole reaction curve must shift downwards so there is a
ki > 0 at which the best response by i is to choose xi = 0; i drops out of the market











+ no equilibrium ￿ > ￿
￿ no equilibrium
￿ = ￿
+ 1;xi > 0 ￿ = ￿
￿ 1;xi = 0
￿
+ > ￿ > ￿
￿ 2;x1
i;x2









￿ > ￿ 2;x1
i > 0;x2
i = 0
Table 2: Number of NE with Convex RCs, ￿
+ > ￿
￿Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities13
2.3. The Conditional Nash Equilibrium Correspondence. The Nash equilib-
rium correspondence (NEC henceforth) shows how the Nash equilibrium action varies
with ￿: Figure 3 gives the Nash equilibria for varying ￿ in the concave reaction curve
case, when @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@k > 1: Here starting from a high value ￿
￿ we continuously reduce
parameter ￿ and the RC shifts downwards to the south east. The two positive Nash equi-
librium choices get closer together converging to a single value at ￿
+. After that further
reductions in ￿ result in the unique Nash equilibrium choices being at the origin. This
yields the generic NEC shown in Figures 7￿8. In Figure 7 below ￿
+ and above ￿
￿ this is
single valued, but between these values, it is a correspondence with three possible choices
at each ￿.
S SD S+
x = xD￿x,S￿ x







Fig. 8: NEC, @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@k ￿ 1,
concave RCs
Figure 8 takes the case in which the reaction functions are concave and have a slope
smaller than unity at the origin.
It is important to realise that the type of NEC shown here is global and generic
depending only on the technological assumptions A1-A3 that we have made: that is
in general no action will be undertaken for a range of low values of parameter ￿, then
there are multiple possible aggregate choices for a given ￿, with a low positive action level












Fig. 10: NEC, @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@k ￿ 1,
convex RCs
A similar construction for convex RCs gives the NEC for the case of convex reaction
functions. In Figure 6 we have shown how the Nash equilibrium choices vary with ￿
when @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@k < 1: Starting from ￿
+ and continuously reducing ￿, the RCs shift
downwards to the south east, thus yielding the generic form of the NEC as illustrated
in Figure 9. When instead @x￿(0;￿
￿)=@k ￿ 1, continuous reductions in ￿ yield the NEC
illustrated in Figure 10.
3. Endogenising parameter ￿ : Unconditional ￿ ￿ x equilibrium
In many applications there is also an equilibrating process on ￿ so that x;￿ are simultane-
ously determined. This requirement is de￿ned by some function ￿ = ￿(x) eg ￿ may be a
regulatory parameter which adjusts the favourableness of the environment in response to
the actions x. For instance x re￿ ects the behaviour of the private sector and ￿ is a control
parameter set by a public sector agency. Another example would have ￿rms choosing
quantity x while the market auctioneer sets the price ￿. We assume that
A5 ￿(0) > 0;￿(x) ￿ 0 for all x; ￿
0
(x) < 0;￿(x) = 0 for some high x: x￿(k;0) = 0 for
any k.
Apart from normalisations on ￿, the substance of this assumption is that ￿ decreases
with x and becomes zero at some ￿nite x. Similar analysis follows if ￿ is increasing in x.Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities15
Now a symmetric ￿ ￿ x equilibrium requires x;￿ to solve both
x = x￿ (x;￿)
￿ = ￿(x)
3.1. Characterising the Number of ￿ ￿ x Equilibria and their Regularity.
From Figures 7 ￿ 10 it is clear that ￿ ￿ x equilibrium is not generally unique but we
can apply the idea of regular and critical equilibria which is associated with study of the
equilibrium manifold (Balasko,(1992), Echenique and Sabarwal, (2003)). The NEC has
particular generic and global properties. It is well de￿ned but non-monotonic. With con-
cave RCs the NEC generally has an S-shape but what we might call a rotated V-shape in
the convex case. These patterns are generic under our technological assumptions. Exactly
what shape the segments of the S-shape or rotated V-shape have depend on the precise
functional form of the payo⁄ functions, there may be local wiggles within segments. The
￿￿x equilibrium combines the NEC with the function ￿(x). The basic shape of the NEC
allows us to ￿nd lower bounds to the number of ￿ ￿ x equilibria and their regularity.
To get simple clear con￿gurations we take ￿(x) to be a stylised linear function
￿(x) = A ￿ Bx A;B > 0
Concave Reaction Curves. Various positions of a linear function are shown, as-
suming ￿(x) = 0 at a ￿nite x. The result is that for relatively inelastic ￿(x) there can
be either multiple ￿ ￿ x equilibria (if A is relatively small) or a unique equilibrium with
￿ above ￿
￿ (for relatively high values of A). When the RCs are concave but have a slope
at the origin below unity it is somewhat simpler: from inspection of Figure 8 any linear
























We can use the ￿(x) linearisations to see how the number of ￿ ￿ x equilibria varies
with the parameters of ￿(x). In fact Appendix A3 shows that we can ￿nd a complete
characterisation of the equilibrium set in the (A=B;1=B) space as shown in Figure 12.
There are critical values of the vertical intercept A=B = ￿0 and the slope 1=B = ￿0
de￿ned by the tangent of NEC at ￿
￿, which divide the space of all ￿(x) functions into
regions with a given number of equilibria. The numbers in Figure 12 refer to the number
of equilibria within a region. For example for any ￿ above ￿0 there is a line segment
between ￿ and ￿
￿ and also a tangent to the NEC passing through ￿. These two lines
de￿ne slopes ￿1 (￿);￿2 (￿) between which there are three equilibria. If the slope is equal
to either ￿1 (￿) or ￿2 (￿) we lose the third equilibrium. For slopes outside this range
or intercepts below ￿0 there is a single equilibrium. For a given intercept above ￿0 the
nature of the equilibrium set suddenly changes discontinuously as the slope increases from
a single equilibrium to two equilibria (at ￿2 (￿)), then to three equilibria (between ￿2 (￿)
and ￿1 (￿)), to two equilibria again (at ￿1 (￿)) and ￿nally to a unique equilibrium (above
￿1 (￿)); the system is structurally unstable and exhibits a fold bifurcation, see Figs 15-16
below (Strogatz,(1994)).
With concave reaction functions but a slope less than unity at the origin the irregularity
of equilibrium does not arise: since x = x￿ (x;￿) is always nondecreasing and ￿(x) strictlyConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities17
decreasing, there is always at most one equilibrium.
Convex Reaction Curves. If the reaction functions are convex Figure A2 of Ap-
pendix A4 shows that the tangent at ￿ = 0 with its slope ￿0 and intercept ￿0 divide the
space of ￿(x) functions into areas with di⁄erent equilibrium con￿gurations. At ￿0;￿0
there is a unique equilibrium at ￿ = 0 and ￿0. For intercepts ￿ of ￿(x) above ￿0 the
tangent to NEC ￿ (￿) de￿nes another unique equilibrium. For slopes of ￿(x) that are
greater than ￿ (￿) there are two equilibria while for slopes less than ￿ (￿) there are no
equilibria. For intercepts of ￿(x) below ￿0 for any slope there is a unique equilibrium
which may involve x > 0 or inactivity. Figure 13 shows the ￿ ￿ x equilibrium and Figure





















Figure 14: ￿￿x equilibrium, Convex RCs
Again the nature of the equilibrium set shifts discontinuously with the slope and
intercept of ￿(x). For example take a ￿xed slope above ￿0 and gradually increase the
intercept from an initial value below ￿0. First there is a unique equilibrium with inactivity
which moves continuously to a unique equilibrium with positive activity. But when the
intercept moves past ￿0 there are suddenly two equilibria. This pattern of two equilibria
increases until the curve ￿ (￿) is reached at which point there is only a single equilibrium.
With further increases in the intercept we lose even this equilibrium.Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities18
The Signi￿cance of these Results. When there are multiple equilibria, compar-
ative statics are generally ambiguous unless a movement from any equilibrium in the
original set gives directions of change which are identical for all equilibria in the new
equilibrium set. For example in the original position suppose E1;E2;E3 are all ￿ ￿ x






3 are equilibria. Comparative statics are unam-







same directions of change. If ￿ is treated as parametric as in Figures 2-6 with convex or
concave reaction curves, the comparative statics are ambiguous (movement starting from
a high level equilibrium is not in the same direction as movement starting from a low
level equilibrium). Comparative statics with respect to ￿(x) functions are also ambigu-
ous when the reaction curves are convex or concave. For example in Figure 11 within the
region with three equilibria, falls in B lead to a fall in x (possibly discontinuously) so
long as we start from a high action equilibrium, whether the move is to a high or a low
action equilibrium, but the e⁄ect on ￿ is ambiguous. Starting instead from a low action
equilibrium, the fall in B leads to a rise in x and fall in ￿, whether the movement is to
a high or low action new equilibrium. Hence the nature of the comparative static e⁄ects
depends on the starting point. Once B reaches the point at which one of the equilibria
is at ￿
+ the two positive action equilibria merge together and vanish for further falls in
B. Analogous arguments apply with convex reaction curves in the case of Figure 13.
Our model violates the su¢ cient condition for strong comparative statics in Echenique
and Sabarwal (2003). As in their model comparative statics are problematic at critical
equilibria: for some directions of change, even locally equilibria cease to exist.
Figures 11-14 have been drawn with a single curvature to NEC. If the curvature of
NEC changes over its length there may be further equilibria.
4. Examples
We apply the preceding arguments to two cases of industrial equilibrium.Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities19
4.1. Cost Externalities in Perfect Competition. There are I identical price-
taking ￿rms with a cost externality between them, decreasing returns to scale and down-
ward sloping market demand. Homogeneous output x is produced and sold in a perfectly
competitive market. Total cost of each ￿rm i is a⁄ected by the average output level of
other ￿rms in the market, ki. Each ￿rm has cost function C(xi;ki): The cost function
satis￿es
A6 Cx > 0;Cxx > 0;Ck < 0;Cxk < 0;C(0;k) = 0;C > 0 if x > 0;k ￿ 0;Cx(k;k) ￿nite
for any k
i.e., marginal cost is positive and increasing but ￿nite on the 45￿ line. Total and
marginal cost fall with increases in the average output of other ￿rms. There are no
￿xed costs.
Individual pro￿t is
￿i = Pxi ￿ C(xi;ki)
where P is the output price (in terms of our general notation we can identify P with ￿;
and ￿ with V ). The best responses solve the ￿rst order condition for pro￿t maximisation
P = Cx(xi;ki) if P ￿ Cx(0;ki) > 0
xi = 0 if P ￿ Cx(0;ki) ￿ 0
Hence the optimal output of the individual ￿rm solves
x￿(ki;P) = argmax
xi
f￿(xi;ki;P)jxi ￿ 0g i = 1;::;I
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and the reaction curve shifts in a direction of increasing xi as P rises with ki constant.












If negative this gives us concave RCs, if positive convex RCs.
The equivalent of ￿
￿ is an intermediate price P￿ de￿ned by
P￿ = Cx(0;0)
At P￿ if other ￿rms are producing zero output then ￿rm i wishes to produce zero. We
know that P￿ is ￿nite.
Concave Reaction Functions. If (3) is negative at all x, k, then the reaction curve
for ￿rm i is concave to the 450 line and shifts with P as shown in Figure 2.
At P￿ i will wish to produce less than ki if P￿ < Cx(ki;ki): Hence for high ki the
reaction curve will fall below the 45 degree line if
lim
ki!1
Cx(ki;ki) > P￿ = Cx(0;0)
ie eventually increasing marginal cost o⁄sets the cost reduction due to the externality. In
e⁄ect for su¢ ciently high k at P￿ the reaction curve is below the 450 line. It is also then
below the 450 line at P < P￿. For su¢ ciently high average outputs of other ￿rms, i￿ s
best response is a lower level of output than this (which implies that the reaction curve
eventually passes below the 450 line for all prices). This replaces assumption A3.
The pattern of NE then follows those of Table 1. With concave reaction functions,
there will tend to be multiple NE, but a unique Nash equilibrium if the slope of the
reaction curve at the origin is below unity.
The Number of NE with Convex Reaction Functions. If (3) is positive at all
x;k, then the reaction curve for ￿rm i is convex to the 450 line (this is similar to theConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities21
framework of Orjasniemi et al., (2008), who have oligopolistic rather than price taking
output market). Here for a su¢ ciently high real output price the reaction curve is wholly
above the 450 line for any k
P > Cx(k;k) for any k for su¢ ciently high P
Then at su¢ ciently high real output prices the reaction curve must lie wholly above the
450 line.
Applying the standard analysis with convex RCs, there may be no Nash equilibrium
at all or either one or two equilibria depending on the level of P and the slope of the RC
at the origin. This gives us a pattern of NE as in Table 2.
Market/Strategic Equilibrium. The price itself, P, is generally endogenous being
determined jointly with k from the interaction between the market demand curve and the
aggregate supply curve. Taking the market demand curve as linear
D = A ￿ BP A;B > 0 (4)
gives a number of equilibria which vary with the slope and position of the demand curve
and the convexity/concavity of the RCs. With concave RCs, the exact number and type
of equilibria shift discontinuously as the demand curve changes slope or intercept, exactly
as in Figure 12.
With convex RCs this is also true except that now the largest number of possible
equilibria is two as the slope and intercept of demand varies as in Figure 14.
An Explicit Example. Suppose the cost function is
C(x;k) = [abx(k + A1)￿b + Aa
2]1=a ￿ Aa
2 i = 1;::;I;0 < a < 1;b > 0
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which can be either positive or negative depending on the strength of the externality
e⁄ects. For b = 1, @2xi=@k2
i > 0 and the reaction function is convex.
We use the output reaction functions as de￿ned by (5) and the demand curve as de￿ned
by (4), to show that, the exact number and type of market-strategic equilibria,(ME), shift
discontinuously as the demand curve changes slope or intercept (see Figures 15 and 16
which are constructed for the technological parameters in Tables 3,4). In Figure 15 there is
one critical equilibrium for values of A;B which gives x equal to 2:3 (near this equilibrium
the slope of the equilibrium manifold in Figure 15 becomes unbounded). There is another
apparent critical equilibrium when x = 0 which corresponds to losing the origin as a
ME equilibrium. Figure 16 looks similar but here there is the generic critical point when
the equilibrium x is 0:23. However there is another apparent critical point when the
equilibrium x is about 1:7 which arises due to a local wiggle in the NEC.
k
B





Figure 15: ME with concave RC￿ s
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(1) a = 0:2, b = 0:3, A1 = 0:5, A2 = 1:9, B = 151, A = 87
(2) a = 0:2, b = 0:3, A1 = 1:5, A2 = 1:9, B = 151, A = 87






















@k > 1 3:65;0:15,
@RC(P;k)
@k > 1
(3) a = 0:5, b = 1:5, A1 = 0:5, A2 = :0005;B = 14:5, A = 9:5
(4) a = 0:5, b = 1:5, A1 = 1:5, A2 = :9;B = 14:5, A = 9:5
Table 4- Alternative market equilibria - Convex reaction curves
Note that in the convex reaction curve case in Table 4 we ￿nd an additional P ￿ x
equilibrium due to the nonlinearity of the NEC correspondence.
4.2. Imperfect Competition with Demand Externalities. Another application
is to a downstream duopoly with product di⁄erentiation in which the inverse demand
function for each ￿rm depends on the output level of its rival. Firm i has inverse demand
function
pi = P(xi;xj)
We allow the rival￿ s output to have two di⁄erent e⁄ects on the market inverse demand:
on the one hand the higher xj the greater the willingness to pay for xi due to complemen-
tarities between the goods. On the other hand the higher the total outputs (xi;xj) the
more saturated is the market and the lower the willingness to pay for additional units.
In general the marginal market saturation e⁄ect may be di⁄erent for the two goods-an
increase in xi may generate a larger or smaller fall in pi than an increase in xj: There isConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities24
only one factor of production, labour, and each unit of labour is supplied at a price 1=￿.
Output is produced according to a linear production function where one unit of labour is
required to produce one unit of output. Hence the payo⁄ function for ￿rm i is
V (xi;xj) = P(xi;xj)xi ￿ (1=￿)xi
We assume that Vxx < 0 (marginal net revenue is falling).
The best output response of i is de￿ned by
xi solves Vx(xi;xj;￿) = 0 if Vx(0;xj;￿) > 0
xi = 0 if Vx(0;xj;￿) ￿ 0
which we can write in our usual way as
xi = x￿(xj;￿)
The slope @x￿(xj;￿)=@xj is of ambiguous sign depending on the sign of Vxk at any point
and Vx￿ > 0. Similarly there may be convex or concave RCs.
Note that the reaction function is identical for both the ￿rms. But even so there
may be asymmetric NE as well as symmetric ones-essentially because we no longer have
monotonic RCs. It is easiest to see this in the context of a speci￿c example
pi = A + ￿(A1 + xj)￿ ￿ xi ￿ bxj
where ￿;￿;A;A1;b > 0: The best response for ￿rm i is
xi = (1=2)A + (1=2)￿(A1 + xj)￿ ￿ (1=2)bxj ￿ (1=2￿) (7)
so long as V1(0;xj;￿) = A + ￿(A1 + xj)￿ ￿ bxj ￿ 1=￿ > 0 but xi = 0 if V1(0;xj;￿) ￿ 0:
The slope of the reaction curve for interior best responses is set by
@x￿=@xj = (1=2)￿￿(A1 + xj)￿￿1 ￿ (1=2)b
The concavity or convexity of the reaction curve is given by the sign of
@2x￿=@x2
j = (1=2)￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿(A1 + xj)￿￿2Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities25
so that the reaction curve is concave if ￿ < 1, convex if ￿ > 1:
To see some speci￿c examples set A = 1, b = 7:45, A1 = 0:5, ￿ = 3:5, ￿ = 2:75: There
are four NE, two symmetric and two asymmetric exactly as in Figure 17. The loci ab and
cd show the high and low output symmetric equilibria respectively as functions of ￿: For













Figure 17: NEC, A = 1, b = 7:45,
A1 = 0:5, ￿ = 3:5, ￿ = 2:75
This example has a high value of b so that the market saturation e⁄ect of the rival￿ s
output is much higher than the own output e⁄ect. Typically with b < 1 there will not be
any asymmetric equilibria, but two symmetric equilibria. In this case, the equivalent of
￿
￿ is an intermediate wage de￿ned by
￿
￿ = 1=(A + ￿A￿
1)
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At ￿
￿ if the other ￿rm is producing zero output then ￿rm i wishes to use no labour and
the level of output then corresponds to 0 = x￿(0;￿
￿). For ￿xed input prices, we can use
the output reaction functions as de￿ned by (7), to show that, for speci￿c values of the
parameters, it is possible to derive all the Nash equilibrium con￿gurations analysed in the
previous sections. For instance, with @x￿ (0;￿)=@xj = (1=2)￿￿A1
￿￿1 ￿ (1=2)b > 1 (< 1)
and ￿ < 1 (￿ > 1), changes in ￿ yield all the Nash equilibrium con￿gurations for the
concave (convex) case when ￿ is exogenous. If b > 2, then the reaction functions will no
longer be monotonic, and changes in ￿ can generate asymmetric Nash equilibria. In this
context, we can identify a critical ￿ and x, ￿ and x, such that only symmetric equilibria





































Then for 0 < ￿ < ￿, there are two symmetric NE and two asymmetric NE, as in Figure
17. Further reductions of ￿ lead to lower outputs in the low symmetric NE but to higher
outputs in the high symmetric NE; in the asymmetric equilibria, any decrease in ￿ leads
the high output ￿rm to produce more and the low output ￿rm to decrease its production
levels. Eventually for su¢ ciently low ￿s, the low output ￿rm is driven out of the market,
as illustrated in Figure 17.
Suppose now that b ￿ 1, so that changes in ￿ only generate symmetric NE and the
NEC is exactly as in Figures 7￿8 when ￿ < 1 or as in Figures 9￿10, when ￿ > 1. Suppose
also that ￿ is determined endogenously, according to the following linear function, which
positively relates 1=￿ to the total level of output:
1=￿ = B + B1 (x1 + x2) B;B1 > 0Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities27
Then with concave RCs, the exact number and type of equilibria shift discontinuously as
the wage function changes slope or intercept, similarly to Figure 12. With convex RCs
this is also true except that now the largest number of possible equilibria is two as the
slope and intercept of the wage curve vary, similarly to Figure 14.
5. Conclusions
In the strategic complementarity paradigm with identical players, the common outcome
is that there may be multiple non-cooperative symmetric equilibria which can often be
Pareto ranked-the system can get stuck at a low level equilibrium in which all players are
uniformly badly o⁄ as compared with their outcomes in an alternative equilibrium. It
has been used to explain many features of social situations: Keynesian type phenomena,
undesirable monetary/in￿ ation equilibria, social security/e⁄ort structures.
With identical increasing reaction functions the equilibria are all symmetric. In this
paper we add some structure to the payo⁄ functions which allows us to determine their
number. The crucial idea that we add is that of concavity or convexity of reaction func-
tions. With reaction curves satisfying one of these assumptions we can tie down the
number of symmetric equilibria and they range from 0 ￿ 3: We add an exogenous para-
meter ￿ to the reaction curves to delineate the number of non-cooperative equilibria as a
function of ￿: The Nash equilibria are conditional on ￿: Here ￿ has the interpretation of
setting the favourableness of the environment, both payo⁄s and best responses increase
with ￿: For some values of ￿ the equilibrium is unique but for other values there are several
alternative non-cooperative equilibria. This allows us to characterise the ￿ equilibrium
correspondence, showing the set of conditional non-cooperative equilibrium best choices
for each value ￿:
It also allows us to embed the strategic complementarity equilibrium model in a
broader equilibrium approach in which there are some additional equilibrating forces on
￿ which leads to the idea of an unconditional ￿ ￿ x equilibrium. In this, x is a non-
cooperative equilibrium given a particular value ￿ of ￿; but ￿ itself is an equilibrium value
of ￿ given x: For simple characterisations of the additional equilibrating forces on ￿ (aConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities28
￿ ￿ x equilibrium essentially adds a new equilibrium relation ￿ = ￿(x)), we can then
determine which of the non-cooperative equilibria can appear as ￿￿x equilibria and espe-
cially under what circumstances the system can remain at a low level Nash equilibrium.
Unfortunately this approach does not generally eliminate multiplicity of equilibria despite
the endogeneity of ￿: It suggests that a more direct hands on approach to equilibrium
selection of ￿ is required to eliminate the indeterminacy eg Stackleberg leadership in the
choice of ￿.
We also add some exogenous parameters to the function ￿(x) and show that as these
vary the set of ￿ ￿ x equilibria can discretely shift. Basically these shifts in ￿(x) can
generate a fold bifurcation in the ￿ ￿ x equilibrium set.
To motivate the abstract discussion, we analyse some examples. We take an industry
with a large number of price-taking ￿rms who enjoy technological spillovers in costs-
marginal and total costs of any ￿rm for a given output level are lower, the higher is the
average output level of all other ￿rms. Each ￿rm chooses its output taking the real output
price P and the average output of other ￿rms as parametric. If P is ￿xed we have the
standard strategic complementarity paradigm. Here P plays the role of the parameter
￿: At industry level P may be determined by the interaction of market demand and the
aggregate output of ￿rms. Market equilibrium determines both P and the output of each
￿rm x in a P￿x equilibrium. The function ￿(x) derives from the market demand function
and the output supply correspondence of ￿rms. We show that the number and nature of
P ￿ x equilibria vary with the slope and intercept of the market demand curve, and that
variations in these demand parameters can yield a fold bifurcation in the P ￿x equilibria.
A second example highlights the lack of robustness of the usual strategic complemen-
tarity results to non-monotonicity of the reaction curve. This is a duopoly with product
di⁄erentiation and identical constant marginal costs where the inverse demand curve fac-
ing one ￿rm is not monotonic in the output of the second ￿rm. On the one hand there is
a product di⁄erentiation/complementarity e⁄ect which increases the demand for one ￿rm
as the output of the second rises. On the other hand there is a market saturation e⁄ectConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities29
which reduces the demand for one ￿rm when the output of the other rises. This can gen-
erate non-monotonic reaction curves, and, as a result, multiple symmetric or asymmetric
Nash equilibria. Taking the common marginal cost as the parameter 1=￿; we explore how
the equilibrium output levels vary with ￿:
The strategic complementarity paradigm has been a rich stimulus generating new
reasons why equilibria may fail to be attractive normatively. It has been applied in both
static and dynamic contexts. The present paper adds some general structure to allow
more precise characterisation of the possible outcomes and also embeds the approach in a
model in which additional di⁄erent equilibrating forces are at work, eg. prices in markets,
to test whether the common welfare consequences of the paradigm hold up.
A. Appendix
A.1. Symmetric Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1. Any Nash equilibrium of the game must be a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium. At a symmetric Nash equilibrium x￿ (xi;￿) = xi, so any Nash equilibrium is on the
450 line.
Proof. This follows from the detailed assumptions on V (￿). With identical payo⁄
functions, the reaction functions will be identical and given by:
xi = x￿(￿j6=ixj=(I ￿ 1);￿)
Any inequality between agents￿actions (for instance x1 > x2 > x3:::) means it is possible
to identify a highest action, say xi = maxk xk, and a lowest action, xj = mink xk, for any
k = 1:::I and i 6= j. But since we are assuming Vxk (x;k;￿) > 0 (the RCs have a positive
slope), this would also imply
ki < kj
and hence
xi = x￿(ki;￿) < x￿(kj;￿) = xj
which is a contradiction. So any Nash equilibrium is on the 450 line3.
3Note that we cannot have a Nash equilibrium in which one agent chooses xi = 0 and all the otherConditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities30
A.2. With Concave RCs ￿
+ Exists. Since at ￿
￿ the RC has slope greater than
unity at the origin but also crosses the 450 line, there must be a point on the RC above
the 450 line at which it has slope unity. From this point, consider the locus of points at
which the slope of successive RCs is unity as ￿ falls. This locus cannot pass through the
origin or cut the vertical axis at xi > 0: if it did, it would have to meet or cross the RC
for ￿
￿, which means that two RCs for di⁄erent prices must cross, contradicting the fact
that @x￿=@￿ > 0. Hence the locus must cross the 450 line which de￿nes ￿
+. The identical
argument holds for convex RCs.
A.3. Generic number of equilibria with Concave Reaction Functions. To
explore the regularity of these equilibrium patterns for the concave case in which the
slope of the RCs exceeds unity at the origin, Figure A1 displays the basic setting.
In Figure A1 the tangent at ￿
￿ de￿nes ￿0;￿0. For intercepts above ￿0 there are three
equilibria when the slope is in between ￿1 (￿) and ￿2 (￿). For slopes below ￿2 (￿) there is a








Figure A1: Concave RCs,
@x￿ (0;￿
￿)=@ki > 1
agents choose xj > 0, with i 6= j. Since payo⁄ functions are increasing in the average action of all the
other players, then the agents choosing xj > 0, with i 6= j, would face a lower k than the agents choosing
xi = 0 and so should choose xj = 0 as well.Conditional and Unconditional Multiple Equilibria with Strategic Complementarities31
A.4. Generic number of equilibria with Convex Reaction Functions. In Fig-
ure A2, ￿0;￿0 are de￿ned by the intercept and slope of the tangent to the NEC at ￿ = 0,
here there is a unique equilibrium. If the intercept of the ￿(x) functions is higher than
this there is a tangent to the NEC de￿ned by the slope ￿ (￿). This also de￿nes a ￿(x)
function giving a unique equilibrium. For ￿(x) intercepts above ￿0 and slopes below
￿0 there is no equilibrium while for slopes above ￿0 there are always two equilibria. If
the ￿(x) intercept is exactly ￿0 but the slope is steeper than ￿0 there are two equilib-
ria. If the slope is ￿ atter than ￿0 and the intercept is ￿0 there is a unique equilibrium.
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